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Abstract 
We examine the effects of the cross-border interdependence of vertically related industries on trade policies and welfare of related 
countries. With the rapid trends of globalization of value-adding chains of multinational firms, fragmentation of the production 
process is a wide spread phenomenon of corporate strategies. This paper demonstrate that as the cross-border interdependency of 
vertically related industries is deepened, protective trade policies are replaced by the pro-trade policies based on an oligopoly model 
where each representative firm competes over vertically interdependent products. In addition, when the market power of the 
upstream firm is higher, the tariffs imposed on the intermediate goods are lowered. Although welfare implications of cross-border 
interdependence of the vertically related industries are affected by the relative technology structures of the upstream firms and the 
downstream firm of competing economies, a firm with technological advantage benefits more from the deepened cross-border 
interdependence with increased competition due to the higher homogeneity of the final products. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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Introduction 
Recent feature of global production networks is characterized with the enhanced fragmentation of value-adding 
chains of corporate production process. Moreover, the high value-added sectors of industries have larger stages of 
vertical production process, which deepen the trends of fragmentation. The rapid progress of information and 
communication technologies has reduced the cross-border transaction costs sharply, and the global offshoring 
strategies became a dominant strategy to procure intermediate goods.  
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Based on these increasing trends of fragmentation and cross-border outsourcing of the intermediate goods, this 
paper examines the effects of the cross-border interdependence of vertically related industries on trade policies and 
welfare of related countries. We focus on a case where representative firms of two countries with asymmetric 
technologies are competing over differentiated final products while downstream firms are dependent on upstream 
firms in different levels of cross-border interdependency in vertically related production processes. This paper 
demonstrates that as the cross-border interdependency of vertically related industries is deepened, protective trade 
policies are replaced by the pro-trade policies. In addition, when the market power of the upstream firm is higher, the 
tariffs imposed on the intermediate goods are lowered. Although welfare implications of cross-border interdependence 
of the vertically related industries are affected by the relative technology structures of the upstream firms and the 
downstream firm of competing economies, a firm with technological advantage benefits more from the deepened 
cross-border interdependence with increased competition due to the higher homogeneity of the final products. 
A numerous literatures studied the vertically integrated industrial structures, and seminal papers about the vertical 
production processes include the follows: Markusen (1990) examines the query of tariff protection in a model of 
differentiated final goods. While the conclusion of the normative analysis is that a small tariff must be welfare 
improving, he shows that a small tariff can reduce welfare when specialized inputs are sufficiently complementary. 
Spencer and Jones (1991) examine a model with a low-cost vertically integrated firm exported the intermediate goods 
to rival firm of the final goods. The main findings are that first, the vertical supply decision is affected by the importing 
country’s supply condition for the intermediate goods and the tariff on the final goods exported by exporting country. 
Secondly when there is Cournot competition for the homogeneous final goods, policy by the exporting country tends 
to support the private incentives. If the difference in profit margins is positive, optimal policy tends to increase the 
extent of vertical supply. While if the difference in profit margins is negative, optimal policy tends to shift supply 
decision from vertical supply to vertical foreclosure. Ishikawa and Lee (1997) analyze the effects on the domestic 
economy of domestic tariffs imposed on the intermediate goods or the final goods in vertically related markets. They 
show that tariffs on the intermediate goods induced the entry damage domestic intermediate goods firm and/or benefit 
domestic final goods firm, first. Secondly, tariff on the final goods induced the exit damage both domestic intermediate 
goods and final goods firms. Horiuchi and Ishikawa (2009) examine the relationship between tariffs on a final goods 
and technology transfer in vertically related markets. They show that not only tariff increases but also tariff reductions 
may lead to technology transfer. Increase of tariff on the final goods induces ‘tariff-jumping’ technology transfer, 
whereas ‘entry-deterring’ technology transfer is generated by tariff reductions. 
The major contribution of this paper lies in that we demonstrated the impacts of different level of cross-border 
interdependency in vertically related industries taking consideration of technology asymmetries of the upstream 
industries and downstream industries while the earlier literatures did not consider the technology structure of the 
vertical production processes in explicit ways. Based on our detailed analysis of the vertical production processes with 
technology asymmetries, we could determine the condition for welfare improvement with the cross-border 
interdependency of vertical production processes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic structure of the model. Section 3 
examines the effects of tariffs in the interdependence of nations of the intermediate goods. Section 4 we analyze 
economic welfare under the interdependence of nations of the intermediate goods. Section 5 provides the conclusion 
and some final remarks. 
The model 
We assume that there are two countries, a domestic and a foreign country, and that each country has a single 
imperfectly competitive firm that produces a differentiated good, with the home firm in a home country and the foreign 
firm in a foreign country. Typical domestic and foreign final-good producers are referred to as firm dD  and dF , 
respectively, and typical domestic and foreign intermediate-good producers as firm uD  and uF , respectively. In the 
upstream stage, homogeneous intermediate goods are produced under unilateral trade in the intermediate goods, while 
differentiated intermediate goods are produced under bilateral trade. In the downstream stage, differentiated final 
goods are produced by each country. We focus on the intermediate goods and final goods markets which are both 
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characterized by Cournot oligopolies. There exist one final-good firm and intermediate-good firm in each country. 
The domestic and foreign governments impose a specific tariff both on the intermediate goods and the final goods. 
A representative consumer in the home country and in the foreign country, respectively, is assumed to have quasi-
linear preferences that can be represented by a quadratic utility function 
2 2( )( , , )
2
DD FD
D DD FD DD FD DD FD
q qU q q z aq aq bq q z    
                (1) 
2 2( )( , , )
2
DF FF
F DF FF DF FF DF FF
q qU q q z aq aq bq q z    
                (2) 
where 0a ! , 0 1b  . The market structure ranges from the case where the goods are independent ( 0b  ) to the 
homogeneous good case ( 1b  ). 
The utility functions (1) and (2) give rise to a linear demand structure. Inverse demand functions are given by 
DD FD DDp a bq q                                       (3) 
FD DD FDp a bq q                                       (4) 
DF FF DFp a bq q                                      (5) 
FF DF FFp a bq q                                       (6). 
 
There are three stages of decision. In stage 1, the domestic government and foreign government decide their optimal 
tariffs of the intermediate goods and the final goods. In stage 2, taking the optimal tariffs of the intermediate goods 
and final goods as given, the domestic and foreign intermediate-good producers decide the levels of price of the 
intermediate goods. In stage 3, taking the price of the intermediate goods as given, the domestic and foreign final-good 
producers decide the levels of output of the final goods. 
The effects of tariffs in the interdependence of nations 
   In this section, we examine the effects of tariffs in the interdependence of nations on the intermediate goods which 
produced by each country. We first analyze the case of no trade in the intermediate goods and then examine the case 
with it.  
3.1. No trade in the intermediate goods 
We consider the case where a single vertically-integrated firm exists in each country. In order to obtain a sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the game by backwards induction. The profit functions for firms ID  and IF  are 
1( ) ( )( , )ID DD DF DD u d DD DF u d DFq q p c c q p c c tM qax       3                 (7) 
2( , () ) ( )IF FD FF FD d FD FF d Fu u Fq q p c c t q p cMax c qE D E D   3             (8). 
In the second stage, solving these first-order conditions simultaneously, we can obtain the profit maximizing outputs 
as functions of 1t  and 2t by each firm: 
2
2 2
( 2) ( 2) (( 2
4
) )d uDD
a b b c b c btq t
b
D E                          (9) 
1
1 2
( 2) ( 2) ( 2 2
4
( ) )d uDF
a b b c b c tq t
b
D E                             (10) 
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   In the first stage, given the equilibrium outputs and prices, we can obtain the optimal tariffs on the final goods in 
each country: 
1
1 ( )
3 d u
t a c c  
                                             (13) 
2
1 ( )
3 d u
t a c cD E  
                                  (14). 
In case of no trade in the intermediate goods, the optimal tariffs on the final goods are affected by the change of 
constant marginal cost both in the intermediate goods and in the final goods regardless of product differentiation. The 
market share of final goods depends on the constant marginal cost both in the intermediate goods and in the final goods 
from rival country. Thus if the marginal costs of the intermediate goods and the final goods in domestic country 
decrease, the foreign government imposes the higher tariff on the final goods which exported by domestic country; 
and that if the marginal costs of the intermediate goods and final goods in domestic country increase, the foreign 
government imposes the lower tariff on the final goods which exported by domestic country.  
   The above analysis is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. If the marginal costs of the intermediate goods and the final goods in domestic(foreign) country 
decrease, the foreign(domestic) government imposes the higher tariffs on the final goods imported from the 
foreign(domestic) country. The full vertical integration of the upstream and downstream firms in each country, with 
no cross-border interdependency in intermediate goods, induces each country to take more protective trade policies 
when she faces more competitive rivals with lower production costs.  
 
3.2. Unilateral trade vs Bilateral trade in the intermediate goods 
In this section, we consider the case where unilateral trade in the intermediate goods and bilateral trade in the 
intermediate goods. In order to obtain a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the game by backwards 
induction. The profit functions for firms dD  and dF  are 
1 1 1
(( , ) ( ))
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In the third stage, the firms dD  and dF  take the price of the intermediate goods as given and choose outputs to 
maximize their profits. The profit maximizing outputs of the firms dD  and dF  are given by  
1 2
1 2
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   In the second stage, the firms uD  and uF  take the demand as given by Eq. (17)-(20) and choose the price of the 
intermediate goods 1D
w
and 2D
w
to maximize their profits.  
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            (21) 
The profit maximizing the price of the intermediate goods of the firms uD  and uF  are given by  
1 1 1
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In the first stage, given the equilibrium outputs and prices, we can obtain the optimal tariffs on the final goods and 
the intermediate goods in each country: 
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   Next we examine the case where bilateral trade in the intermediate goods and compare to the case where unilateral 
trade in the intermediate goods. In order to obtain a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the game by 
backwards induction. The profit functions for firms dD  and dF  are 
1( ) ( )( , )dD DD DF DD F DD DF F DFd dq q p w c q p w c tM qax       3                   (27) 
2 )) ( )( , (d d dF FD FF FD D FD FF D FFq q p w c t q p wx c qMa D D      3                (28). 
In the third stage, the firms dD  and dF  take the price of the intermediate goods as given and choose outputs to 
maximize their profits. The profit maximizing outputs of the firms dD  and dF  are given by  
2
2 2( , , )
( 2) ( 2) 2
4
D F
DD D F
db a b c bt bw wq w w t
b
D     

                   (29) 
1
1 2
(( , , ) 2 ) 2
4
( ) 2 2D
F
d F
DF D
b a b c t bw wq w w t
b
D    

                    (30) 
2
2 2( , , )
( 2) ( 2 ) 2 2
4
D F
F F
d
D D
b a b c t w bwq w w t
b
D     

                   (31) 
1
1 2( , , )
( 2
4
2) ( 2 ) D F
FF D F
db a b c bt w bwq w w t
b
D     

                  (32). 
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In the second stage, the firms uD  and uF  take the demand as given by Eq. (18)-(21) and choose the price of the 
intermediate goods 1D
w
and 2D
w
to maximize their profits.  
3( ) ( )( )u D D FDD Fu Fw w c qMa qx t 3                             (33) 
4) ( )( )(u F uF DD DFF w w c t qM x qa E   3                         (34) 
The profit maximizing the price of the intermediate goods of the firms uD  and uF  are given by  
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     (36). 
In the first stage, given the equilibrium outputs and prices, we can obtain the optimal tariffs on the final goods and 
the intermediate goods in each country: 
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Fig. 1. The effects of tariffs both on the intermediate goods and the final goods under unilateral trade vs bilateral trade in the intermediate 
goods 
The difference in the impact of a tariff in the interdependence of nations depends on: (ν) the degree of product 
differentiation between final goods; (ξ) the difference of constant marginal costs of production at both the final and 
the intermediate goods. 
The above analysis is summarized in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 2. The optimal tariff level on the final goods produced by domestic firm under unilateral trade in the 
intermediate goods is higher than bilateral trade in the intermediate goods. Also the optimal tariff level on the final 
goods produced by foreign firm under unilateral trade in the intermediate goods is higher than bilateral trade. As the 
cross-border interdependence of vertical production process deepens, trade barriers between interdependent 
countries are reduced to more pro-trade regimes with all different patterns of technology asymmetries.   
 
 The equilibrium trade policies on the intermediate goods are characterized as follows:  
 
Proposition 3. The optimal tariff level on the intermediate goods produced by domestic firm under bilateral trade 
in the intermediate goods is higher than unilateral trade in the intermediate goods. That is, when the foreign country 
is more dependent on the intermediate goods produced by the domestic country with unilateral trade in intermediate 
goods, the optimal tariffs of the foreign country are lower than the case of the bilateral trade in intermediate goods 
mainly due to increased importance of consumer surplus in welfare consideration.   
 
Figure 1 summarizes the features of the optimal tariffs on the intermediate goods and final goods under unilateral 
trade and bilateral trade in the intermediate goods with varying ranges of production differentiation and technology 
asymmetries in the upstream and downstream industries discussed in Proposition 2 and 3.  
Welfare Analysis 
In this section, we examine the welfare implications of different level of cross-border interdependence of vertical 
production processes in the domestic and foreign countries, considering the consumer surplus, producer surplus, and 
tariff revenues in each case.  
The consumer surpluses in the domestic and the foreign country, respectively, are 
2 21 1
2 2D D DD DD FD FD DD FD DD FD
CS U p q p q z q q bq q      
                  (41) 
2 21 1
2 2F F DF DF FF FF DF FF DF FF
CS U p q p q z q q bq q      
.                  (42) 
The welfare of the domestic and the foreign country, respectively, under multilateral free trade is given by the sum 
of consumer surplus from its domestic market and the profit of its own firm and tariff revenue: 
D D D DW CS PS GS                                      (43) 
F F F FW CS PS GS   .                                   (44) 
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Fig. 2. The effects of welfare in the interdependence of nations 
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The major findings of welfare implication of different level of cross-border interdependency in vertical production 
processes are summarized in the proposition 4 focusing on the case where the domestic upstream firm has the 
technology advantage over the foreign upstream firm.  
Proposition 4. In case of u uc cE , if d dc cD! , the welfare of the domestic country, which has a higher 
technology in the upstream firm, is highest when b gets closer to 1, implying that a firm with technological advantage 
benefits more from the deepened cross-border interdependence with increased competition due to the higher 
homogeneity of the final products. 
 
 The welfare implication cross-border interdependence of the vertical production process for a country with 
technology disadvantage is summarized in Proposition 5.  
Proposition 5. In case u uc cE! , if d dc cD! , the domestic country’s social welfare is highest with the case of 
full vertical integration in each country resulting in no trade in intermediate goods, implicating that the enhanced 
cross-border interdependency does not guarantee the welfare improvement when a country suffers technology 
disadvantage. 
Concluding remarks 
This paper examined the effects of the cross-border interdependence of vertically related industries on trade policies 
and welfare of related countries. Based on a model assuming representative firms of two countries where downstream 
firms are dependent on upstream firms, we demonstrate that as the cross-border interdependency of vertically related 
industries is deepened, protective trade policies are replaced by the pro-trade policies. In addition, when the market 
power of the upstream firm is higher, the tariffs imposed on the intermediate goods are lowered. Although welfare 
implications of cross-border interdependence of the vertically related industries are affected by the relative technology 
structures of the upstream firms and the downstream firm of competing economies, a firm with technological 
advantage benefits more from the deepened cross-border interdependence with increased competition due to the higher 
homogeneity of the final products. In addition, the enhanced cross-border interdependency of vertical production 
process does not guarantee the welfare gains when a country shows technology disadvantages. 
 
Although this paper contributed to existing literatures by demonstrating the impacts of different level of cross-
border interdependency in vertically related industries taking consideration of technology asymmetries of the upstream 
industries and downstream industries, the following works should be complemented for more general insights: the 
general functional approach in terms of preference system and production technologies should introduced for a more 
general policy implications in the future studies.  
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